On connecting natural rights with natural law by Black, V. (Virginia)
ON CONNECTING NATURAL RIGHTS 
WITH NATURAL LAW 
Virginia Black 
Introduction and Thesis 
Since the appearance of a seminal book by Leo Strauss called 
Natural Right and History (1953)1, thinkers faithful to the natural 
law tradition have generally held with Strauss that a radical shift 
occurred some time in the 17th century, or even earlier, say, with 
Grotius (R. Tuck, 1980) 2, whereby natural law thinking 
underwent a serious and irreversible "transformation" into natural 
rights. Or, alternatively stated, natural law was supplanted by a 
concept of natural rights. This is partly because natural rights reject 
natural teleology, a centerpiece of a dominant natural law tradition. 
But it is also because Strauss understood natural rights as the child 
of Thomas Hobbes, a perspective repugnant to natural law. 
Strauss wrote: 
If, then, natural law must be deduced from the desire for self-
preservation, if, in other words, the desire for self-preservation is the sole 
root of all justice and morality, the fundamental moral fact is not a duty but 
a right; all duties are derivative from the fundamental and inalienable right 
1. STRAUSS, L. (1953). Natural Right and History. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, p. 181. 
2. TUCK, R. (1980). Natural Rights Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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of self-preservation. There are, then, no absolute or unconditional duties; 
duties are binding only to the extent to which their performance does not 
endanger our self-preservation. 
Strauss' point, which with few exceptions is generally correct, is 
that the classical natural law tradition, while limiting the authority 
of the state, did not enunciate individual rights against the state, a 
function which modern natural rights emphasize. 
I believe the lingering ideal of the polis prevented^ this 
confrontation. If society is not distinguished from government, 
then the idea of confronting government with a breach of persons' 
rights makes no sense. For Strauss, natural right (not rights) is 
merely an objective basis for discerning right from wrong conduct. 
The two ideas can be seen as quite different. Rights facilitate; 
natural law obligates. Rights protect us from certain kinds of 
misfortune or suffering; natural law, in its teleological form, 
directs us to worthy ends. Rights secure alternatives and choices; 
natural law morally justifies certain alternatives and choices. 
My thesis is this: Despite variances in the two concepts, natural 
law and natural rights, they, for the most part, work together and 
are compatible. In ordinary social contexts, they are even 
necessary to each other, most especially, natural law both 
conceptualizes and helps to bring about a society in which natural 
rights are respected and enforced. Accordingly, although there was 
an historical "shift" it was gradual and perspectival, not divisive. 
Natural rights were dimly seen as a proper extension of moral law, 
a development in the direction of greater moral sensitivity. Rights 
claims indeed reach back into the Middle Ages; while natural law 
claims can be seen in the modem age to function exactly as they 
always have: to instruct and promote human virtue within 
communities of associated persons and, as even Strauss 
acknowledges, to act as a limit upon state authority. 
Strauss' thesis has been exceedingly influential. But his is not 
the only voice in repudiation of the continuity between natural law 
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and natural right. In a recent book, Rights and Persons, 1977)3, 
A.I. Melden, basing his thinking on the notion of rights justified 
by John Locke, writes: 
...neither in the Stoic conception of a natural law... nor in the Aquinian 
natural law that may render null and void as law the statutes of particular 
states, is there any intimation of the moral rights with which Locke among 
others was concerned. 
Calling the conflation obscure and confusing, Melden writes 
boldly that with respect to natural rights, 
there is no appeal to the laws of nature.... And although there remains a 
faint echo of natural law theory in Locke's [position], the conception of a 
moral right that is instanced in the natural rights of persons involves a 
substantial conceptual change or advance... [my italics] from the legal 
conception of rights that had been employed earlier in the field of law.... 
If... there is [this] conceptual change involved in the Lockean doctrine of 
fundamental moral rights, then it is indeed a mistake to assimilate the 
modern Lockean doctrine of fundamental moral rights with earlier natural 
law theory. 
The distinction is put this way by John Gueguen. "... for the 
moderns natural law is a restriction upon nature, a correction of 
nature, which aims at 'liberating' man for the pursuit of his 
personal ends-not at bringing him within the true freedom of 
nature's limits [which is the aim of classical natural law]. Thus the 
emphasis in the moderns [is] upon rights, a concept foreign to 
classical natural law" (1980)4. 
Gueguen uses "natural law" and "modern natural law" as his 
contrasting terminology; but the distinction he makes is the same as 
those who, like Strauss and Melden, contrast natural law with 
[modern] rights. Gueguen holds that rights are premised upon a 
3. MELDEN, A. I. (1977). Rights and Persons. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, pp. 228-31. 
4. GUEGUEN, J. (1980). Personal correspondence with the author. 
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false view of man and society, namely, radical individualism and 
moral conventionalism. Clearly he too is tracing rights doctrine to 
Thomas Hobbes rather than to John Locke. 
So too is A.J.G.M. Sanders in his essay, "Conflict and 
Consensus in South African Natural Law Thinking" (1988)5, 
when he posits a striking and disparaging disparity between natural 
law and natural rights which he calls "two prototypes of social 
order". Natural law is, on his schema, a voluntary commitment of 
social life, "cohesive, legitimate, integrated, persistent, and 
depends upon (and generates) consensus, solidarity, reciprocity 
and cooperation". Contrariwise, rights involve not commitment but 
"inducement, coercion, and power... They are divisive, 
malintegrated and beset by contradictions. They depend upon (and 
generate) structured conflict, opposition, exclusion and hostility". 
For entirely different reasons, M.J. Detmold, in his book The 
Unity of Law and Morality (1984) 6, rejects natural rights 
altogether. "I don't think there are rights in any fundamental sense. 
Respect for you gives reasons for action in regard to you; and this 
translates better into my duty than into your right.... Of course, 
right and duty are often correlative, but it is important which is 
fundamental...". 
Detmold rejects rights not because he is a staunch natural law 
thinker but because he reduces all normative obligations to 
empirical norms. Duties can be formulated in terms of norms 
whereas rights, he believes, cannot. 
The American jurist Roscoe Pound wrote something very 
interesting on this matter in his An Introduction to the Philosophy 
5. SANDERS, A. J. G. M. (1988). "Conflict and Consensus in South 
African Natural Law Thinking". In J. HUND (Ed.), Law and Justice in South 
Africa. Johannesburg: University of South Africa. 
6. DETMOLD, M. J. (1984). The Unity of Law and Morality. London, 
Boston, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
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7. POUND, R. (1954). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law. New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 15. 
8. HARTIGAN, R. S. (1989). Natural law, nature and biology, a modern 
synthesis. (Unpublished manuscript) 
of Law (1954)7. He recognized that natural law and natural rights 
were distinct in that natural law was "devised for a society 
organized on the basis of kinship" whereas rights characterized a 
society "which conceived of itself as an aggregate of individuals 
and was reorganizing on the basis of competitive self-assertion". 
Nevertheless, he writes, "the convenient ambiguity of ius, which 
could mean not only right and law but 'a right', was pressed into 
service and ius naturale gave us natural rights". 
I think it is clear that natural law and natural rights are in many 
respects different concepts and different doctrines in different 
contexts. And this is so even while we recognize that their 
historical variations robbed them of absoluteness and determinacy 
of meaning, such as the increasing secularization of rights or the 
turn from a teleological view of man's duty of perfection to a more 
modernistic concern (patterned on Aristotle) with the structure of 
legal society, such as the writings of Lon Fuller exemplify. I do 
not want to contest their by-and-large conceptual distinction, even 
though their historical evolutions, still going on (R.S. Hartigan, 
1989)8, make both of them indeterminate; and as we shall see, they 
share many attributes in common. Whatever natural law is, it is a 
doctrine of human duty and obligation. It is instructional of our 
moral obligations to conduct ourselves in certain ways. It ties into 
virtue and character. In contrast, natural rights prescribe a doctrine 
of value attribution: For persons to have a natural right is to have a 
kind of inalienable possession with which they can do things. A 
working definition of natural rights, one that will serve us here 
well enough, connotes rights as fundamental, normative attributes 
fixed equally to persons as a sign of their moral worth and dignity. 
Rights go in two directions at once: They expand the opportunity 
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for people to do things and they narrow the chances for people to 
suffer things or be harmed. 
Everyone recognizes also that rights imply duties and 
obligations. As Hospers puts it, "... a right is the reverse side of 
an obligation not to interfere with its exercise" (J. Hospers, 
1961) 9 . If I have a right to enjoy liberty of thought or of 
movement, then an obligation is imposed upon everyone else not 
to encroach upon my liberty of thought and movement. So in this 
sense, rights and duties, different as they are, are related. One 
implies the other and both are generally reciprocal: owed to 
everyone, by everyone. Nevertheless, moral duties far outnumber 
rights, for not everyone to whom I may owe a duty has a right to 
my obligation. In certain important contexts, rights are not needed. 
They are superfluous, or even obstructive (M. Golding, 1987) 1 0. 
Also, conversely, there are persons who possess rights but are 
under no corresponding duties. Babies and incompetents possess 
rights, but because they possess no autonomy they cannot fulfil 
duties to anyone. 
This rights-entail-obligation rule, with its reasonable 
qualifications, seems firm, foundational and incontestable. No one 
denies i t Hence I need say no more about i t 
We have already pointed out two primary lines of natural law 
thought: 1) the individual-aspirational line of thought toward 
fulfilment that is proper to one's rational humaness (teleological 
natural law as duties to bring oneself to a higher domain of 
intellectual excellence - areti), and 2) the line of thought (which I 
hold to be Aristotelian in inception and developed by the Stoics) 
which sees the natural law as those sets of obligations essential to 
community life. There are primary lines of thought in rights 
discourse as well. We will encounter some of these as we now ask 
9. HOSPERS, J. (1961). Human Conduct. New York, Burlingame: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 
10. GOLDING, M. (1987). Moral community. Social Science, V. 72, nos. 
2-4, Fall, pp. 128-131. 
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the first question relevant to our discussion: Why has a radical 
natural law/natural rights shift been claimed? Why is their 
connection denied? On what grounds is it reasonable to hold that 
these two moral concepts are so different that they move in 
separate directions, repudiating any necessary connection between 
them? To this enquiry we now turn. 
Why is the Connection Denied! 
I would like to offer a few suggestions as to why the natural 
law/rights distinction seems discontinuous, even opposing. The 
considerations I want to mention are mainly historical and 
perspectival; they tend to characterize how rights have been seen 
and the contexts shaping these perspectives. Accordingly, they 
tend to exaggerate, I think, the distinctions between them and this 
obfuscates bridging the two moral ideas. Listed below, but not in 
order of importance, are criticisms that I believe may have 
influenced sharply separating in certain minds these two moral 
ideas, that of natural law and that of natural rights. In a paragraph 
or two following each criticism, I advance my responses. These 
are intended to help move my thesis along toward acceptance. 
1. Criticism Natural law presupposes community; it is a 
doctrine aimed at the social and moral life of man. Natural rights 
stress the individual and what is his due. They say nothing about 
what the individual owes to others except respect for others' 
rights. 
Natural rights, too, cannot be understood except in a social 
setting. They are appropriately construed only as social morality-
there is no point to a right unless other parties are present who can 
violate the right. Moreover, to save a person from the kinds of 
rights abuses he can suffer is the paradigm of a social duty. The 
above criticism that natural rights are not a social doctrine derives 
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from Thomas Hobbes whose doctrine was based solely on self-
preservation. Hobbes had no social theory at all; his single, 
individual "right" was the right to life against a sovereign who 
might threaten this life; and he argued that all our obligations are in 
the end self-serving. Hobbes' philosophy respects no autonomous 
moral norm, no virtue for its own sake, no inherent moral 
worthiness in anything. These conditions countermand the idea of 
natural rights. 
Clearly this is not the rights tradition referred to here. Hobbes 
as a moral egoist has no theory of moral rights whatsoever. It is a 
mistake to charge modern rights doctrine with a Hobbesian 
foundation. The emphasis of natural rights on the individual is not 
anti-social. Indeed, it is intended to preserve the inherent moral 
worth of the individual who may not be wantonly used by others 
or by the state for its own ends. In their function of thwarting the 
interference of political power with the innocendy chosen activities 
of individuals, rights exhibit their intrinsically associational nature. 
To disallow ulterior coercion is at the same time to endorse the 
opposing value of natural, voluntary human sociality. If natural 
law tells us that coercion is evil, then "a moral right is something 
that a person has a claim to by natural law" (F. Foldvary, 1985) 1 1. 
Let us not forget, too, on the other side of the coin, the radical 
individualism of Socrates who set the tone for the teleological 
natural law, a doctrine which cannot be understood except as 
presupposing the intrinsic moral worthiness of individuals freely 
aspiring to their duties of moral and intellectual perfection. 
2. Criticism. We have witnessed in our times an illicit and 
incoherent overextension of rights to include the positive actions 
that were always the prerogative of duty and righteous conduct. 
These have come to be called "entitlements". 
11. FOLDVARY, F. (1985). Natural Rights. Berkeley, CA.: The Gutenberg 
Press, p. 13. 
ON CONNECTING NATURAL RIGHTS WITH NATURAL LAW 191 
There is no more serious criticism of rights than the above 
insight that rights discourse has been radically altered from 
invoking a security against state encroachment to an insistence that 
the powers of the state be used to redistribute human goods. Here 
rights language has shown itself to be easily debased. Rights 
today, in many countries, have exploded out of all proportion and 
feasibility. Since entitlements necessarily magnify the powers of 
the state, to enforce "entitlements" in law directly and explicitly 
contradicts the meaning of a natural right, namely, not to be 
coerced in one's person and in those claims or actions inalienably 
fixed to one's person. Let us not, then, confuse natural rights, a 
universal morality, with the modern positive law of entitlements 
which are conventional and relative to the legal state which claims 
to effect them. 
Here, I propose, is the Great Shift: Not from natural law to 
natural rights but from natural rights to conventional, positive 
rights. From rights against the state to entitlement by use of the 
state. From anti-statism to its contradictory, statism. (V. Black, 
1989) 1 2 . Were Leo Strauss living today, he would have strong 
arguments for another book! I believe we can reasonably trace to 
Enlightenment philosophy and the French Revolution, despite their 
necessary curatives, the weakening of natural rights proper and the 
theory of the limited state which rights imply. Both extremes, 
monarchy and Revolution, destroyed the intermediary social 
structures which gave context and meaning to the idea of 
community moral law. 
3. Criticism. Modern rights doctrine seems to override our 
moral obligations to others. Natural rights have the tendency to 
imperil Judeo-Christian charity and relief of suffering by 
competing with the obligations so clearly commanded by these 
12. BLACK, V. (1989). Rights, reform and the rule of law. Paper presented 
at the Fourteenth World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social 
Philosophy. Edinburgh. 
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religious traditions. Natural law cannot compete because it is 
voluntary whereas rights are enforced. 
If rights are extended to include entitlements, they do indeed 
usurp the moral functions of the natural law. But the so-called 
entidement rights, as we saw, are not what I defend as the natural 
rights connected to natural law. 
It is clear, too, that rights have to be legally enforced to be 
effective, whereas virtue does not-cannot. This important 
difference between moral conduct which is freely chosen and law 
which is involuntarily enjoined helps to reinforce the insistence that 
natural law and rights are incompatible types of obligation. But 
basic natural law precepts, such as, Do no harm to others, or 
respect the life and security of persons, have always been 
enforcible. Indeed, that natural law will be enforced, that is, will 
define the limits of the positive law, is what natural law theorists 
hope for when they affirm that the positive law should be bound 
by the moral law. 
4. Criticism. Rights are role-defined. For example, contracts 
entail rights, and status or office entails rights. Traditionally, these 
are legal rights. But moral rights are something altogether different 
from legal rights which are specialized and constricted by the roles 
that define them 
Such a claim, I believe, only shows that there are different 
kinds of rights. The moral rights that may connect with natural law 
must also, like natural law, be universal. So-called "perfect rights" 
are indeed role-restricted; but their existence and importance do not 
preclude a doctrine of moral natural rights. 
The natural law early on, too, was judicialized. Gratian, for 
example, turned natural law into an axiom of jurisprudence. This 
made possible the concern of natural law with the precepts of 
natural justice as a legal fact. One contemporary author, for 
instance, believes that, "Few if any jurisprudential categories have 
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enjoyed such a long currency as the concept of natural law" (G. 
Koziol, 1987) 1 3. 
The Stoic interpretation of natural law was a formative influence 
on the Roman legal codes. And after the St. Bartholomew 
Massacre, the French Protestants made much of the binding nature 
of the moral law to hmit the power of the kings, an exact replica of 
the function of natural rights. The famous Vindiciae contra 
tyrannos (of disputed authorship) in the 16th century systematized 
the argument and "became one of the landmarks of revolutionary 
literature" (G.H. Sabine, 1961 ) 1 4 . Commentators on the natural 
law as well known and reputable as A.P. d'Entreves (1970) 1 5 and 
Otto von Gierke both remark on the insight that the natural law is 
incompatible with tyranny over persons, to constrain which was a 
central purpose of the natural law. 
Someone might argue that to limit power (a traditional function 
of the natural law) is not the same as to enforce individual rights 
against power. But I would argue that enforcing individual rights 
against power is one of the most effective ways to limit power. 
Rights are an implementing means to the restriction of arbitrary 
power. Accordingly, we can understand that since one of the 
paramount purposes of natural law, historically, has been to limit 
arbitrary tyranny, then with respect to this function of natural law, 
natural rights are implied. Natural rights are a partial definition, an 
"operational definition", as it were, of what it is to put natural law 
to its most popular and significant judicial use. 
13. KOZIOL, G. (1987). Lord's law and natural law. In H. J. JOHNSON 
(Ed.), The Medieval Tradition of Natural Law. Kalamazoo, ML: Western 
Michigan University, pp. 103-117. 
14. SABINE, G. H. (1961, 3rd ed.). A History of Political Theory. N. Y., 
Chicago, San Francisco, Toronto, London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, p. 
377. 
15. d'ENTREVES, A. P.12 (1970). Natural Law. London: Hutchinson 
University Library. 
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5. Criticism. To have a natural right does not inform us what 
values to choose. We may, and do, use our rights to enjoy 
anything our egos desire. We have seen in our day that narcissism 
and selfish egoism have been the consequence of rights. 
Such a trenchant criticism indicates grave weakness and 
cowardice not with respect to rights but with respect to our moral 
education. If rights are universal possessions, then the moral 
relativism and cultural conventionalism implied by the charge of 
selfish individualism cannot be the result only of natural rights. 
But rights language is easily debased, as we saw; and there is truth 
in the charge that wanton interpretations of what it is to have a right 
contribute to wanton behavior. We feel very uneasy in admitting 
that we have a right to do wrong or that we have a right not to do 
what is right. And yet the abnegation of such rights or the 
limitation of rights, as Rousseauss writings make manifest, only to 
those actions that do the right leads to tyranny. 
The spread of wanton behavior into society at large makes 
moral education more difficult. What is essential, then, is that 
natural law be understood as the content of moral education. On 
this ground, to have a natural right, then, is to have, among other 
liberties, an opportunity to learn right conduct and good values. I 
shall have more to say about this in my concluding remarks. 
6. Criticism. Natural law as understood by most philosophers 
has its origin in divine command. Its source is religious. Natural 
rights have been secular from the beginning. 
The pre-Christian origins of natural law were not religious. The 
secular ideas set in motion by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the 
Stoics and their followers intimately penetrate natural law doctrine 
throughout its long history, both secular and religious. Its 
universality and persistence are in part attributable to the fact that 
its moral merits do not depend upon any special religious 
perspective (although in my opinion natural law is fully compatible 
ON CONNECTING NATURAL RIGHTS WITH NATURAL LAW 195 
with such a perspective and there is no reason why it should not 
when appropriate be assumed or argued for). 
With respect to a religious association with rights, here are the 
opening lines of The Law (1850)1 6, that masterful and brilliant tract 
by Frederic Bastiat, the French economist, statesman and author 
who despised the tyranny he so presciently predicted of the French 
Revolution: 
"Life is a Gift from God 
We hold from God the gift which includes all others. This gift 
is life-physical, intellectual, and moral life. 
"But life cannot maintain itself alone. The Creator of life has 
entrusted us with the responsibility of preserving, developing, and 
perfecting it.... 
"Life, liberty, and property do not exist because men have made 
laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life, liberty and property 
existed beforehand that caused men to make laws in the first place" 
(p. 5). 
What is Bastiat leading up to? He is leading up to natural rights. 
"What, then, is law? It is the collective organization of the 
individual right to lawful defense. 
"Each of us has a natural right-from God-to defend his person, 
his liberty, and his property..." (p. 6). 
It is true that natural rights do not logically depend for then-
coherence and validity upon a religious source. But its provision, 
as in Bastiat, is not inappropriate. The history of variation in both 
natural law and natural rights theory accommodates without 
contradiction a religious source as a kind of "special hypothesis" 
which some philosophers see fitting to provide. The American 
16. BASTIAT, F. (1850). The Law. (7th printing 1970). Irvington-on-
Hudson, N. Y.: The Foundation for Economic Education, pp. 5-6. 
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natural law tradition rests on religious assumptions. Is it a mere 
coincidence that this strong and emblematic natural rights tradition 
pervading the founding documents that constitute American legal 
society came directly out of the matrix of natural law thought? 
Sometimes I wonder if there is a kind of yearning on the part of 
those who accept Strauss' extreme thesis-namely, that rights take 
their origin and inspiration from Hobbes' a-social doctrine of the 
state-a kind of yearning to preserve certain ideals such as the polis, 
the Golden Age of the Church, the securities of the legacy of the 
Roman Law, or the assumed tranquility of the Middle Ages with 
its images of social order and patrician virtue. I would like to 
acknowledge that there is great good in all these traditions that 
ought to be fostered and preserved. But in my opinion, whatever 
permanent goods they have bequeathed to history ought not be 
used to snuff out or devalue the idea of natural rights, an idea 
which seems to me admirably to represent advances in 
civilization's moral sensitivity. Just as, for example, Jacques 
Maritain has updated and changed Aquinas' natural law to make it 
applicable to contemporary experience, while yet retaining an 
eminent respect for its character, so may we update the natural law 
without distorting its spirit and direction. 
In Defense of Rights 
We are ready for our second question. Why is it important to 
argue for natural rights as in a continuous parabola with natural 
law, or as supporting each other? Why, for instance, can we not 
simply agree that coercion and the ulterior use of persons is, by 
natural law, an evil, and leave it at that? Suppose natural rights had 
never appeared in the history of mankind. Would something 
morally critical be missing? Would something that natural law 
cannot deal with be crucially absent in our moral culture? Would 
natural law itself perhaps lack chords in its own voice? 
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17. HARTIGAN, R. S., Op. cit. 
Well I suppose I think that a moral ideal that has been around a 
long time needs cautious examination, both from the perspective of 
why it arose-what laid the path for its appearance within the 
civilizing landscape of the human condition-and from the 
perspective of its justification. A kind of intuition tells me that 
natural rights are correct and crucially significant for the moral life 
of community; and so there is, in me, a desire to explore the 
interconnectedness among valid moral concepts to see what overall 
theoretical design or unity can be achieved, especially among 
concepts that have jointly been enunciated or whose concrete 
instrumentalities have been combined. 
Natural law exhibits a hearty evolution, one that is still going 
on. The work of Richard Hartigan, for example, to weld natural 
law with the empirical findings of modem socio-biology is an 
example 1 7 . Natural rights may be just one segment of this 
evolution in the history of natural law, or they may not be. We 
have to look and see. Also, there is the element of practical 
application; rights have consequences of great magnitude for 
modem society and its citizens. 
It is true, I am sorry to say, that the legal fact of rights spawns 
conflict: conflict in the law and conflict among interest groups 
when two rights cannot simultaneously be enforced. I have certain 
views on this matter which cannot be developed here. But isn't the 
adversarial posture a necessary by-product of protecting the 
innocent from the assaults of the state? Would we really want to 
dispense with, say, the kind of work against intimidation and 
terror that Amnesty International has brought to our attention, or 
the efforts of international courts to rectify gross rights-injustices 
to individuals? Isn't it exacdy with respect to these projects that the 
adversarial posture of the individual against the state becomes of 
crucial moral importance? I do not know what justifies such moral 
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efforts as these except human rights. This brings me to my third 
point. 
Rights discourse is generally stronger in rhetorical impact than 
discourse about our duties to our fellows, and the fact that the state 
can enforce a right furnishes society a stronger instrument with 
which to condemn evil. Francisco Suarez believed that rights were 
powers or capacities to do something. I do not believe this is what 
an individual right is; but Suarez is going in the right direction. 
Rights do generally enable or empower us to do more than we 
otherwise could do; it is just that rights are also possessions of 
young children who cannot exercise them or enjoy their 
empowerments. And rights also, as we saw, alleviate suffering. 
In our times, times that have brought about the modern 
Leviathan state, rights against the powers of the state are crucial 
additions to our moral vocabulary. I cannot think of a concept 
more suited to thwart coercive, collective aims than the idea of an 
individual right. 
Rights simply make a stronger statement than an appeal to our 
general duties. They assert a moral requirement with a kind of 
impelling force. "It is right that I be treated justly" may be an ideal. 
"I have a right to be treated jusdy" declares an imperative. Wasn't 
Hesiod's claim stronger when he appealed not to the fact that 
treating him unjusdy in his inheritance was wrong but that he had a 
right to his just inheritance? This was no egotistical, self-serving 
claim. It was, to be sure, a legal right to which he appealed. But 
such a legal right is universalizable. It is an absolute moral truth 
that persons have rights to their just inheritance. 
How else but through the language of rights can one express the 
claim that it is one's due that he be allowed to speak freely, to leave 
a country in which he is abused or unhappy, to associate with 
whom he wishes (to prefer his family to living with strangers), or 
to practice his chosen faith? It is not everyone's categorical moral 
duty to do these things for others. The natural law does not enjoin 
them. But it is everyone's duty not to interfere with those who 
ON CONNECTING NATURAL RIGHTS WITH NATURAL LAW 199 
wish for themselves to carry them out. This latter kind of duty is 
implied by the corresponding right that expresses the claim. It is 
the right here, then, that is foundational. The right is not, like its 
correlate duty, derived. 
There is a sense, though, in which to carry out one's 
obligations is stronger than a right. In coming under a natural law, 
one's conscience, the core of his being, is left troubled and 
dissatisfied if the right conduct that is owed is neglected or 
transgressed. One who is obliged to act rightly is thereby, by such 
an obligation, strengthened in his will and rectitude. If one fails 
this test of moral will and rectitude, one's very person, the self that 
defines our unity and dignity, is jeopardized. 
Granted, too, if it cannot be secured by legal society a right is 
weak, having only ideal status. But so, too, the obligation to do 
what is right is weak if that obligation is easily ignored or carries 
no sanctions or unwanted consequences. In the first case, the 
rights-holder is weakened in his confrontational status with those 
who would deprive him of his right. In the second case, he to 
whom right conduct is owed is weakened. But he who owes it also 
is weakened in the loss of his sacred self. 
Let us note that in tying natural law to one's conscience and 
sense of duty, radical individualism is presupposed. This is as it 
should be. Both natural law and natural rights presuppose the 
moral worthiness of the individual. They also presuppose what is 
equally important: sentience, the capacity to feel pain. These 
attributes utterly preclude an a-social view of man. 
What I have said above may justify the notion of natural rights. 
Daniel Shapiro has very recently written, "Rights make a 
distinctive contribution to moral reasoning if there are some actions-
which are evaluated differently when looked at from a rights point 
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of view as opposed to a nonrights point of view" (1989) 1 8. But 
how does this move us along the path of my thesis, namely, that 
natural law and natural rights are conceptually related? As well, 
that both are essential and mutually enabling parts of our moral 
condition? 
What Supports the Connection! 
Numerous voices have alleged to a relationship between natural 
law and natural rights. Not all of them have proved their case. 
Often the language is loose and unexplained; no relevant or specific 
connection is clarified. Not all of these voices are flattering or 
approving either. 
Nevertheless a sampling of these voices issuing from various 
contemporary contexts shows us that the idea of relating natural 
law to natural rights is "in the air". What, then, have these thinkers 
claimed, and why have they made these claims about natural law 
and natural rights? 
"[Natural law is] an ideal critique of positive law whereby to 
secure [natural rights] in their integrity" (R. Pound, 1954)1 9. 
Duties to the self presuppose rights. Rights are... derived (H. 
Veatch, 1985)2 0. 
"Burke's eloquent appeal to the 'natural rights' of traditional 
Natural Law enabled him... to transcend the commercial and 
national powers which sacrificed human rights to a narrow self-
interest" (P. J. Stanlis, 1965) 2 1. 
18. SHAPIRO, D. (1989). Conflicts and rights. Philosophical Studies, V. 
55, n° 3, March, pp. 263-278. 
19. POUND, R., op. cit. 
20. VEATCH, H. (1985). Human Rights, Fact or Fancy! Baton Rouge and 
London: Louisiana State University Press. 
21. STANLIS, P. J. (1965). Edmund Burke and the Natural Law. Ann 
Arbor, MI.: The University of Michigan Press, p. 60. 
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22. FOLDVARY, F. op. cit., p. 13. 
23. FRANCIS, R. (1988). Something substantial about natural law. Vera 
Lex, V. VIII, n° 2, pp. 10-11. 
Natural rights are "an aspect or feature of the modern doctrine 
of natural law". (International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences). 
Natural rights derive from natural law. They are a consequence 
of natural law, flow from natural law. They are something a 
person has a clain to by natural law. "... the concept of natural 
rights is just natural law seen from a different angle". "I have a 
right to do any act whose violation [coercive prevention] is evil by 
natural law". Natural law tells us what is evil. All that is left we 
have rights to (F. Foldvary, 1985) 2 2. 
"Natural law conveys universal natural rights that obligate 
everyone". The natural law is the same as "our... human rights". 
Natural rights are "drawn from the natural law". The natural law 
exists to protect natural rights (R. Francis, 1988) 2 3 . Francis 
continues: 
Natural law, practically taken, is really the same as our God-given, 
natural, inalienable human rights which always engender corresponding 
responsibilities to acknowledge, protect and promote these same rights 
everywhere. "Doing good and avoiding evil", the main natural law 
principle, operates then to protect and enhance our lives according to our 
basic rights and desires, reasonably taken, to live and flourish in freedom, 
to be happy alone and with others, to be safe and not violated in person, or 
property, or truthfulness, or family life.... 
The prominent and contemporary voice of Jacques Maritain's 
position on the matter is well known to many. For Maritain, it is in 
accordance with the 
... dynamism [between Natural Law, the Law of Nations, and Positive 
Law] that the rights of the human person [my italics] take political and 
social form in the community. Man's right to existence, to personal 
freedom, and to the pursuit of the perfection of moral life, belongs, strictly 
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speaking, to natural law.... natural law deals with the rights and the duties 
which are connected in a necessary manner with the first principle: 'Do 
good and avoid evil'.... For it is natural law itself which requires that 
whatever it leaves undetermined shall subsequently be determined, either as 
a right or a duty existing for all men... (1950) 2 4 . 
Some writers recognize a natural law/rights connection but they 
do not argue for it. They see the use of a familiar and accepted 
language, that of natural law, as a mere strategy to persuade others 
of its continuity with, and therefore our acceptance of, the concept 
of rights. No underlying conceptual connection is claimed or 
justified by such a ploy. Rather, the favorable aura surrounding the 
use of natural law language covers up an alleged elision to natural 
rights. 
Now what do all these asseverations come to? Some of them, as 
with Maritain and Veatch, are in their larger writings argued for. 
But most of the others offer no solid vindication of a natural 
law/natural rights connection other than rhetorical optimism. One 
of these principles with respect to the other is "drawn from", 
"flows out of , "protects", "is a consequence of, "criticizes", 
"secures", "retains", "is the same as", "is an offspring of, "is a 
feature or aspect of the other". Etc. Shall we really just leave it at 
this? 
Natural Law and Natural Rights: Common Denominators 
That natural law and natural rights have something to do with 
each other may spring from recognition of features they share in 
common. Most obvious are the obligations they imply, natural law 
directly in its commands: Do justice. Avoid ignorance. Preserve 
24. MARITAIN, J. (1950). The Rights of Man and Natural Law. Excerpts 
in P. E. Sigmund (Ed.), St. Thomas Aquinas On Politics and Ethics. N. Y. 
and London: W. W. Norton & Co. 1988, pp. 172,210-11. 
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life. Avoid giving offense. Relieve suffering. Natural rights 
indirectly in the universal obligations they entail for all persons to 
respect these rights. Both principles converge on the relief of 
suffering, and both pivot around natural justice as the proper 
foundation for the positive law, natural rights being, as someone 
has said, "those legal instruments that like natural law relieve us of 
human pain and torment". Both have teleological forms: natural 
law directly in its command to aspire to moral and intellectual 
improvement; natural rights indirectly in releasing individuals from 
political bondage so that they can move toward their chosen 
pursuits. The natural law, says Francis, "regulates us according to 
our naturally proper goals... geared toward human fulfilment or 
happiness". 
Both traditions posit primacy of personal agency, autonomy of 
judgment, the inherent moral worth of persons. Natural law views 
this worth from the perspective of what we owe to others; natural 
rights from the perspective of what is persons' rightful due. Both 
also see the moral law as a requirement for social life. 
Accordingly, natural law limits the authority of the state by holding 
it to the moral law. Natural rights enjoin the state against abuse of 
persons and bind it to a duty to protect. 
Both also share important and basic methodological 
assumptions: immutability in the broadest conception of their 
foundational principles, universalizability, and equality of 
application. And both are categorical and universal in their 
conceptual independence of culture, convention, positive law and 
political state. 
Both moral concepts are based on human nature, and both are 
natural as well, not in the sense that they are common but in the 
sense that they are the product of reflective human activity created 
neither by arbitrary choice nor by political will. 
Importantly, for both natural law and natural rights, the notion 
of wrong does service. Wrong is the contrary both of right conduct 
and rights conformity. The wrongs we do to innocent persons are 
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wrong both in harming the integrity of their selves and in violating 
the liberties derived from their rights. To say that it is not right that 
somebody do something is to say that it is wrong that they do it. Is 
this not the same as to say persons have a right that somebody not 
do this wrong to them? 
But geometry and calculus both share consistency, and both are 
members of the class, mathematics. This does not make them 
cognates or require that a stronger relationship be demonstrated 
between them. To share features is one thing. To share meaning, 
or together to be necessary, or jointly to produce an outcome is 
another. 
Some Schemata Suggesting the Connection 
Have we found anything in the above analyses, both in those 
which disclaim a natural law/natural rights connection and in those 
which remark favorably on their alliance, that can be extracted to 
argue for an exact and meaningful relationship between these two 
moral ideas? Let us look at several schemata that have emerged in 
the course of our survey. 
1. If, as I have claimed, natural rights are a distinguishably 
social idea in that their preservation secures the associational 
inclinations of man through counteracting interferences with these 
inclinations, then if the natural law is a guide to moral conduct, it 
would seem that persons must be free or rational to exercise their 
capacity for moral judgment. Rights preserve political liberty. 
Natural law is a guide to personal morality. Rights direct us to 
what is allowed. Natural law states what we are obligated to do. 
Since ought presupposes can, rights, or political liberty, would 
seem to be necessary to the full exercise of our duties. 
But before such a relationship can be cleared for acceptance, an 
intervening relationship must be posited. Otherwise we are guilty 
of confusing political freedom with personal freedom. Is this 
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intervening relationship true? A contingent relationship causally 
connecting the positive social-political conditions to personal 
freedom must prevail. 
Now I think it is a commonplace that one need not live in a free 
or open society in order to be a moral person and conduct one's 
affairs righteously. Doing good and avoiding evil is a universal 
moral law. It binds universally regardless of social conditions. 
Virtue and solicitous attention to one's obligations toward one's 
fellows have a way of finding their place among the stateless, the 
rightless, the deprived and the dispossessed. Degradation tends to 
corrupt, it is true-but conversely, political liberty is no guarantee 
of civility, righteousness, or moral heroism. 
I am afraid such a paradigm as the above is too facile. It not 
only implies social determinism in the pretension to create a new 
man. The causal link between the free society and moral elevation 
of its citizens has also not been firmed or evidenced without 
contradiction. The free society is good for people; all else being 
equal, it is morally better, for numerous reasons, than oppression 
or anything in between. It may be that free societies are more 
generous than oppressive regimes which always, by nature, have 
more wrong with them than oppression alone. But I do not find 
that the political liberty that rights entail necessarily conditions us 
into scrupulous attention to what we owe our fellows on a day-to-
day basis. 
2. What if we follow the lines of teleological instead of 
deontological natural law? Instead of construing natural law as 
what we owe others by virtue of being human, we construe natural 
law as a mandate for moral and intellectual aspiration-as duties to 
perfect ourselves? Here I think we can see the possibility of a 
stronger natural law/rights connection. In a society where rights 
are instituted, individuals have greater opportunities, and where 
such a condition prevails, judgments regarding how one wants to 
implement his goals for self-improvement can wander over a wider 
range of possibilities. The personal freedom here that morality 
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requires is not just a conditioned by-product of the free society; 
personal freedom itself initiates awakened opportunities and 
alternatives by facilitating our perception of them. On this schema, 
natural law and natural right are simultaneously and reciprocally in 
causal interaction. 
However with this paradigm, morally important as it is that 
merit and the pursuit of excellence prevail as individual and as 
common ends, and causally likely as it is that natural law as an 
aspirational imperative promotes this pursuit of excellence, there is 
no guarantee that the aspiration toward excellence will include 
moral improvement or communal caring. It seems that something 
else has also to be in place, something that relates to human nature 
but perhaps is not obviously or instantaneously available to us. 
Also, for those who care, I'm afraid the religious dimension of 
ideological natural law gets squeezed out by an approach that is 
silent on the content and substance of what persons ought to aspire 
to-that is, what they ought to use their rights for. Ought they to 
aspire to the love of God? To doing what God has destined for us? 
To fulfilling God's will? 
Since it is certain that natural rights as we know them leave us 
free to choose our goals, what certainties are there that we will 
choose the natural law? 
In the above two schemata, we have given priority to natural 
rights. Yet we have not been able to assure ourselves that natural 
law either causally follows from a rights-conditioned society or 
will be chosen by free individuals in such a rights-conditioned 
society. Let us then see what happens when we give priority to the 
natural law. Given the logical and moral priority of the natural law, 
is there some dependable connection, causal or conceptual, to 
natural rights? 
3. If we construe natural law in an Aristotelian mode as those 
social constants essential to our associational life, including natural 
justice, then I believe we may offer a modified parallel with natural 
rights. Natural rights reflect our inclinations within community to 
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say and do as we please without harming others who may also say 
and do as they please. An enforcible natural right prevents 
violation of these inclinations, and so natural rights as a means 
possess a power to protect that which natural law enjoins as a 
community ethic. 
On this schema, we have washed out some of the historically 
developed differences between these two concepts, seeing them 
now as somewhat parallel in function, namely: Natural law 
describes our primary social obligations as those which we are 
inclined by our nature to perform; whereas natural rights reflect the 
moral law that socializes these inclinations mankind tends to 
conform to, and they protect these moral inclinations from 
intrusion. 
It is apparent, however, that a parallel or similarity of function 
between two concepts does not describe a conceptual connection. 
And if we consider the case whereby no rights at all are enforced to 
protect our social inclinations from intrusion, we may declare this a 
tragedy but in no way does it mitigate our interpersonal 
obligations, which always hold. Natural rights propitiously 
function when they are in place; but whether they are or are not, 
the natural law is still primary and defines our duties even though 
perhaps at a diminished level of success. 
4. A fourth and final paradigm recommends itself regarding a 
conceptual and functional mutuality between natural law and 
natural rights; and it is this with which I close. We are to 
understand teleological natural law as the moral requirement not 
only to do good in our personal lives or to respect those ends 
toward which we have obligations but also to help bring about a 
common good necessarily inclusive of the kind of human freedom 
that rights describe. Such a paradigm conceives the natural law as 
fundamental and first. It places upon it the imperative to do more 
than "do good". It charges the natural law not only with the 
obligation to relieve human distress but also with reaching out 
beyond the personal and the immediate toward constructing and 
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preserving the legal measures which define flourishing human 
society, namely, those natural rights experience has shown are 
good in themselves for people and society. It cannot be absurd to 
oblige the natural law to foster the natural rights of man which 
experience has shown us have done more than any other rules of 
law, when steadily and with conviction adhered to, to relieve 
human beings of distress and torment. 
What is entailed by this way of construing the relationship is an 
important and indispensable educational function for natural law. 
First, the natural law itself has to be educated to extend its 
perspective to the common good construed in terms of natural 
rights. And secondly, with respect to what rights allow us to 
realize, the natural law has to educate rights-satisfied individuals to 
use their rights for the good values which morality demands. This 
fourth paradigm therefore postulates not rights but natural law as 
the primary catalyst and justification. 
Here I believe we have located significant conceptual and causal 
connections between natural law and natural rights. Conceptually, 
natural rights become part of the constituted meaning of the natural 
law. That is to say, to conform to natural law is in part to enjoin 
the natural rights. From this it follows that causally, natural law 
aspires to the realization of rights within the community. And to 
enjoy a natural right is to learn to use it to act in conformity with 
the natural law. 
This educational essential of the natural law (as old as Socrates 
in his defense of the morally aspirational nature of man) glides so 
ineluctably between the terms, it is impossible, for me at least, not 
to see how the educational corollary is the logical fastener, or 
bridge, that binds natural law to natural rights. Moral education is 
what is missing in some of our earlier attempts to connect these 
requirements, natural law and rights, of the moral institutions of 
life. If natural law is to serve as one of the goals of natural rights, 
then moral education ought to teach us what obligations are 
appropriate as objects of our freedom. Richard Weaver has said 
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that education prepares for the achievement of freedom. If this is 
so, then as John Henry Newman has said, 
Education is a higher word; it implies an action upon our mental nature, 
and the formation of a character; it is something individual and permanent... 
in making choices between truth and error, between right and wrong. For... 
liberal education introduces one to the principles of things, and it is only 
with reference to the principles of things that such judgments are at all 
possible. 
Natural law introduces us to the principles of things. 
